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Abstract
This paper studies the mechanisms that link sociopolitical conflict and (expectations about)
economic prosperity. Motivated by a large body of empirical and historical work on the cor-
relation between economic development and democratization, I develop a game-theoretic
model of economic growth with political economy constraints. In an economy where low-
income agents are credit constrained, rapid and robust economic growth leads to increas-
ing inequality early on, but provides the means to mitigate civil conflict when inequality
becomes sufficiently large. The rate and persistence of growth similarly determines the
stability of extant political institutions and the ability to transition from dictatorship to
democracy.
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As we have seen from the experience of America and other industrialized countries... to
the extent that the conflicts that emerge from modernization are over questions of “who gets
what?” – in other words, to the extent that they are inherently subject to compromise, so
that opposing interests can each come away with something positive in hand – the material
gain that economic growth brings can help to resolve them. In doing so, growth not only
relieves such tensions but also helps bind a society’s competing groups together by fostering
the sense that cooperation and compromise gain results.
– Benjamin Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth
1 Introduction
The connection between economic development and political openness seems obvious upon
casual observation: at present, the OECD countries are almost uniformly wealthy and
democratic, while many underdeveloped nations in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa,
and the Middle East have political systems that are either plagued by perpetual conflict or,
if stable, are decidedly non-democratic. Of course, countries that have higher levels of per
capita wealth today must have grown faster in the past: virtually all of the global divergence
in national wealth accrued over the last 200 years, since the Industrial Revolution began in
Britain (Acemoglu (2009)). This suggests a link between political institutions and economic
growth, which begs the questions: Do “good” political institutions cause growth? Does
growth lead to the formation and endurance of “good” institutions? If so, what are the
driving mechanisms?
The positive correlation – across time and across countries – between per capita wealth
and political openness is one of the most optimistic empirical regularities in economics.
It is also one of the most poorly understood, and – as the above questions suggest – has
been the subject of heated debate in the literatures on growth, development, and political
economy. The goal of this paper is to take a first step toward the theoretical analysis of this
regularity from a somewhat novel perspective: that a nation’s rate of economic growth has
a positive first-order effect on its political stability and social cohesion. The theory that
I develop is distinct from the well-known modernization hypothesis due to Lipset (1959),
for “level effects” play essentially no role in my model. It also provides a more nuanced
set of predictions about the conditions under which different political regimes – namely,
authoritarian and democratic institutions – can remain effective and stable than the extant
political economy theories of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), on which this paper builds.
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The conceptual framework that I use is largely indebted to the historical work of Fried-
man (2006). Through its positive effect on people’s own sense of wellbeing – in particular,
their faith in the future for themselves and their children – Friedman argues, “broad-based”
economic growth is a definitive force for determining a nation’s “moral” advancement: its
degree of political openness and social cohesion, and, of particular importance, its abil-
ity to constructively overcome distributional conflict.1 He attributes this to psychological
factors, namely, that people judge their current economic status relative to two reference
points: (1) their own past economic status and (2) the economic status of those around
them. When growth is strong and people from large swaths of society feel as if they are
“getting ahead” in the first sense, the second reference point becomes less salient. With its
decreased importance, he argues, it is easier to overcome issues of distributional conflict
and perhaps avoid them entirely.
While it is not difficult to imagine how such a theory could be formalized,2 in this
paper I remain in the standard domain of economic rationality. While incorporating such
psychological elements is likely a fruitful area for future research,3 the requisite model-
ing complications would distract from the main point. More importantly, I show that
non-standard behavioral assumptions are not necessary to generate results along the lines
imagined by Friedman.
In the model that I develop, an economy is populated by two different groups of agents
who are divided along socioeconomic lines. Each group contributes to aggregate produc-
tion, but may not be able to accumulate wealth at the same rate. Consistent with existing
theory and empirical evidence on the evolution income distribution during the growth
process4 the difference in accumulation rates drives up inequality at early stages of devel-
opment. As the aggregate economy grows and agents individually accumulate wealth, the
critical issue is how gains from production are divided. Whichever group holds political
1Related mechanisms, particularly the impact of business cycle conditions on voting attitudes, have been
discussed in the political science literature, e.g., Bloom and Price (1975).
2The incomplete contracting framework of Hart and Moore (2008) is a reasonable starting point.
3A handful of existing papers lie at the intersection of behavioral economics, political economy, and
growth theory. Ortoleva and Bogliacino (2013) construct a growth model in which agents have preferences
over their own consumption relative to the societal average and find that this reference dependence results
in weakly higher growth rates. Cole et al (1992) study a related model in which wealth matters as a sign of
social status, and hence agents have indirect utility functions over own wealth relative to a societal average.
Unlike Ortovela and Bogliacino (2013), that paper links these indirect preferences to the specifics of an
underlying social hierarchy. Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Benabou (2008) study models in which agents’
optimally-distorted beliefs result in different preferences over redistribution and government size and can
lead to multiple equilibria.
4See in particular Benabou (1996) for a comprehensive of the survey up to the date of publication.
5
power – the rich “elite” or the poor “masses” – determines the rule that governs this sur-
plus allocation. When the elites control the political process, they rationally choose not
to redistribute to the poor. Thus, inequality eventually reaches a critical level, at which
point redistribution is necessary to maintain political stability. But, if the economy is not
growing at a rapid enough pace at that time, sufficient redistribution may be impossible
to prevent a “revolution.” If the politically powerful elites cannot credibly commit to fu-
ture redistribution, it is in their best interest to offer political control to the poor group –
a process analogous to democratization. But, even under democracy, sufficient inequality
and bad economic fundamentals can result in civil conflict analogous to the case of political
revolution. I also discuss how the rate of growth affects the timing of of these events along
the equilibrium path.5
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of Section 1, I review the relevant
empirical and theoretical literature. In Section 2, I solve a simple toy model that illustrates
the main insights of the paper in the simplest possible form. Sections 3, 4, and 5 develop
and solve the full model and present the main results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and
discusses avenues for future research. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper is related to several distinct strands of literature, each with sizable empirical
and theoretical components. In this subsection, I outline the papers most pertinent for the
present analysis.
Tests of and Explanations for Modernization Theory: The first category consists
of empirical evaluations of the modernization hypothesis and its variants. The primary
question in this literature is whether per capita income levels have a causal effect on the
level of democracy. Barro (1999) studies cross-country and within-country variation in
democracy in the post-war data, finding that differences in per capita income can explain
both. That is, not only are rich countries more democratic, but democratization in these
5I emphasize here – and in critical spots throughout the paper – that one must tread carefully when inter-
preting the economic environment and results of the present model. In particular, I routinely use (perhaps
extreme) terms such as “revolution,” “elites,” “rich and poor agents,” “dictatorship,” and “democracy.” In
large part, this language is derived from the body of work surveyed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and
should therefore only be thought of as a homage to their terminology. More importantly, a fixed terminol-
ogy is necessary for clarity and concision. I urge the reader to not read too heavily into these terms, as
the economic environment that I develop is intentionally reduced-form. Throughout, I make note whenever
multiple interpretations are available, and suggest which might be the most appropriate.
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countries seems to have followed increases in wealth – precisely in line with modernization
theory.
In two related papers, Acemoglu et al (2008, 2009) cast doubt on the modernization
hypothesis. These papers are motivated by concerns about reverse causality and omitted
variables. Acemoglu et al (2008) focus on the effect of income on the level of democracy,
showing that the correlation between per capita income and level of democracy disappears
when fixed effects or instrumental variables (IVs) are introduced into standard democracy
regressions. The authors interpret these findings as evidence for their critical junctures
hypothesis, which states that countries’ political and economic development paths evolve
jointly and that the contemporary distribution of wealth and democracy is the result of
these joint dynamics reaching bifurcation points in the distant past. Another possible
interpretation is that the causal effect of income on democracy operates on much longer
time scales than previously thought (on the order of several centuries), since the income-
democracy correlation re-appears when the sample reaches back to 1500 A.D. Using similar
fixed-effects treatments, Acemoglu et al (2009) study the impact of income levels on tran-
sitions to and from democracy. In the post-war period, countries with per capita income
above the world average in a given year are more likely to undergo democratization in the
subsequent five years; countries with per capita incomes below the world average are more
likely to experience transitions away from democracy. However, when the authors instead
examine variations from the country’s own average per capita income, the correlation with
transitions toward and away from democracy almost entirely disappears. This is taken as
further evidence against the modernization hypothesis.
Motivated by these studies, Benhabib et al (2011) find that the income-democracy
correlation can be recovered even in the presence of fixed effects when the boundedness
of the democracy indices is accounted for. As shown in Murtens and Wacziarg (2013),
as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, the worldwide joint distribution of per
capita income and democracy was largely bi-modal, with wealthy countries holding near
perfect democracy scores. Because the democracy scores commonly used in the literature
are bounded6, it is natural to expect a flat correlation between income and democracy
for already-wealthy countries – especially in the last 50-100 years. Murtens and Wacziarg
(2013) show that, once initial level of democracy is included as a lagged variable in their
6There are several different democracy measures used in the empirical economics literature. These
metrics are somewhat variable. Some measure democracy as a binary variable, while others attempt to
capture the “degree” of democracy in a given country. Regardless of the specification, each of these variables
is censured and, when used in regressions, typically normalized to fall in the interval [0, 1].
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regressions, both income levels and income growth are strong predictors of positive changes
in democracy. They find that human capital levels – particularly when measured via
primary school attainment – are an even stronger predictor of democratization than income
variables.
On the theoretical side, Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and Benahabib and Przeworski
(2004) are the most closely related to my work. The former paper studies an infinite horizon
growth model in which heterogeneous agents play a sequence of Nash bargaining games to
determine the surplus division in each period. Agents have diminishing marginal utilities
of consumption and the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale in the
accumulated factor, and the degree of redistributive conflict in each period is determined
by the relative marginal gains of present consumption via expropriation and future con-
sumption through saving and accumulation. The authors show that, when the marginal
utility of consumption is rapidly diminishing, poorer countries grow more slowly and may
even become caught in growth traps. On the other hand, when the curvature of the utility
function is sufficiently less than the curvature of the production function, the incentive
constraints on conflict bind at high wealth levels. The results of the latter paper are simi-
lar: agents are subject to an income-invariant cost of repression in autocratic regimes, and
democratization occurs when this cost outweighs the marginal utility gain from consump-
tion. Hence, there exists a critical level of capital (i.e., wealth) above which autocracy
cannot be sustained.
This approach gives results consistent with the original modernization hypothesis, since
the level of income is the key determinant of political conflict and democratization.7 In con-
trast, the present paper abstracts from level effects entirely by assuming utility functions
that are linear in consumption and a linear production technology. Hence, my results do
not rely on specific assumptions about the concavity of the utility function and a neoclas-
sical production function. This results both in greater tractability8 and closer accordance
with models of endogenous growth that do not have diminishing returns in the long run.
Inequality, the demand for redistribution, and its effect on growth: Two re-
lated literatures examine the determinants of the demand for redistributive policies and
7Since these models are dynamic and (history dependent) SPNE are allowed, growth rates play an
indirect role by altering the future set of feasible redistributions. However, the level of capital accumulation
is still the primary mechanism.
8I also restrict attention to Markovian strategies, which also adds to the model’s tractability, if at some
cost of generality.
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the effects of these policies – in particular, distortionary taxation – on growth outcomes.
Since the demand for redistribution is closely linked to the degree of economic inequality,
this line of work therefore also indirectly addresses the question of the effect of inequality
on growth.
Much of economists’ thinking about the demand for redistribution is based on polit-
ical economy models that exploit the median voter theorem, and hence correspond to a
“one-person-one-vote” ideal. A central question in this class of models is therefore why we
should observe the wide range of redistributive institutions that exist today in seemingly
similar developed countries. In a seminal paper, Piketty (1995) shows how heterogeneous
priors and private learning about the economic return to effort can lead to multiple equi-
librium levels of redistribution. Agents live for a single period in which they may undergo
economic mobility, and at the end of which they vote on the subsequent period’s level of
redistributive taxation with the objective of maximizing welfare for “poor children” in the
next generation. Learning about the determinants of mobility determine how agents vote
at the end of their lives. 9 This result is interpreted as a “Bayesian learning” interpretation
for the very different redistributive policies instituted in, e.g., the United States and many
Scandinavian countries.
Benabou and Ok (2001) address a distinct but related question: under what circum-
stances will voters rationally choose low levels of redistribution when the income distri-
bution is right-skewed? The key insight to emerge from this paper is that, if there is
persistence in taxation policies, even agents with below-median income will vote for zero
redistribution if the “transition function” governing mobility prospects is sufficiently con-
cave.10 In simple terms, poor agents dislike future redistribution if their prospects for
upward mobility are good enough.
Answers to the second question – how redistribution affects growth – come in two
classes, both of which typically rely on two mechanisms. The first class of models assumes
an orderly – though not necessarily egalitarian – political process, so that the median voter
theorem may be invoked. The seminal paper of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) develops a model
of endogenous growth to show that the rate of growth follows an inverse U-shaped curve as
a function of redistributive taxation. This non-monotonicity is driven by their assumption
9Unlike the papers cited in footnote 5, agents in this model are fully Bayesian. The multiplicity of
ergodic belief distributions is driven by the non-observability of others’ priors and variations in idiosyncratic
income shocks. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) develop a related model in which beliefs about fairness drive
equilibrium multiplicity.
10Mathematically, this is just a corollary of Jensen’s Inequality.
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that taxation funds productive government services. Their key result, however, is that
increased inequality – measured as the difference between average and median incomes –
monotonically decreases the growth rate. As shown in Benabou (1996) and related papers,
this result can be reversed when another channel is taken into account. If the marginal
return on investment varies with income and credit markets are imperfect, positive rates
of redistribution increase allocative efficiency and equilibrium growth rates.11 When both
effects are incorporated in a single model, the rate of redistribution has a non-monotonic
effect on growth rates. Which effect wins out is a function of model parameters – namely,
the location of the pivotal agent in the wealth distribution12 and the degree to which the
marginal return of investment varies with wealth.
Empirically, the non-monotonic effect of inequality and redistribution on growth sug-
gested by Benabou’s analysis seems to be closer to reality. While some degree of redistri-
bution seems to be necessary for growth – particularly at early stages of development when
poor agents may not even have access to, e.g., primary education – the data shows fairly
consistently that too much redistribution is bad for growth.
The second class of models posits that inequality effects growth through political and
economic conflict.13 Benabou (1996) analyzes a “repeated” prisoner’s dilemma with capital
accumulation. Due to the same consumption-savings tradeoff as in Benhabib and Rusti-
chini (1996), there is a maximal growth rate that can be sustained in any SPNE. Conflict
over surplus allocation becomes more likely – and the maximal sustainable growth rate
lower – when agents’ claims to surplus differ greatly from their outside options and their
gains from expropriation. This effect appears in my model when the payoffs to revolution
are “state-dependent;” see Section 4. These insights are also similar to those stemming
from the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), in which conflict becomes more likely
as the gap between de jure and de facto political power becomes larger.
11This can be modeled in several ways. Many papers, including the political economy models of Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000, 2002), follow Galor and Zeira (1993) in assuming that there are non-convexities in
the accumulation technology. In particular, a minimum amount of investment is required to induce a
nontrivial rate of human capital accumulation. Benabou (1996) assumes that agents undertake production
individually, and that the production function has decreasing returns to scale. In the former specification,
redistribution allows poor agents to begin accumulation; in the former, it exploits differences in poor and
rich agents’ marginal returns to (human) capital in production.
12It is easy to depart from the median voter benchmark and allow for variable degrees of “wealth bias”
in the political process. Benabou (1996) and related works present a tractable scheme for doing this with a
continuous wealth distribution. I follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002, 2006) in assuming a discrete
distribution.
13Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and Benahabib and Przeworski (2004) fall in this category, though
they differ from the models discussed here in that they rely on level effects.
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Growth shocks, civil conflict, and property rights: While the models of inequal-
ity and conflict described above highlight the role of property rights in protecting against
expropriation and hence encouraging investment, they do so in perfect information set-
tings. A third literature explores the implications of stochastic fluctuations in growth for
sociopolitical conflict and, indirectly, for growth.
Rodrik (1999) empirically investigates the role of negative “growth shocks” on subse-
quent growth outcomes in the postwar period. In particular, he emphasizes that a sizable
fraction of the growth divergence between East Asia and the rest of the developing world
since 1960 is due to growth collapses in these other regions since the mid-1970s. He at-
tributes this to weaknesses in their conflict-management institutions – i.e., property rights
and the ability to reach compromise at the legislative level when instituting macroeco-
nomic stabilization policies. In particular, and consistent with Friedman’s (2006) theory,
he posits that negative growth shocks exacerbate latent social tensions and can result in
on-path conflict. Consistent with these predictions, he finds that institutional quality and
democracy act as buffers against growth shocks, and that income inequality and ethno-
linguisitic fractionalization make conflict more likely and contribute to persistent negative
effects of transient growth shocks. Importantly, he finds that ethno-linguisitic fractional-
ization is a somewhat more robust predictor of conflict than income inequality.
While the conflicts envisioned by Rodrik and others in political economy are “peaceful,”
development economists are interested in settings that are conducive to the onset of outright
civil war. A popular explanation has been the lower opportunity cost of war induced by
negative growth shocks. Using rainfall as an instrument for agricultural income, Miguel
et al (2004) show that negative income shocks are good predictors of civil conflict in sub-
Saharan Africa. Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2008) and Chassang and Padro i Miquel (2009) develop
theoretical models that find support for the opportunity cost hypothesis. These models
seem similar to mine at first glance, but the mechanisms at work and the interpretations
are very different. In those papers, the opportunity cost to engage in civil conflict is lower
in bad economic times because the one-period loss from not undertaking production is
lower. In other words, they describe settings in which the tradeoff is between “staying on
the farm” and “taking up arms” for a set period of time. Everything in my model (at least
the dynamic version in Sections 3-5) is driven by expectations about long-run effects and
trends.
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2 A simple example: the role of growth and redistribution
Consider an economy that runs in discrete time t ∈ N, which in each period is populated
by a continuum of agents with mass one. Agents live for a single period and are of two
types: rich (r) and poor (p).14 The population of rich agents has measure δ < 12 so that
the median voter is poor. For simplicity, all agents of a given type are identical, implying
that their preferred actions are identical and hence that each type can be modeled as a
single agent.15 I also abstract from the consumption/saving decision: agents have utility
over lifetime wealth, which is passed on in full to their offspring. Formally, the utility of a
type i agent with wealth y is ui(y) = y. In period t = 0, let the output of the economy be
normalized to one so that the initial per capita wealth of rich agents is yr0 =
θ0
δ , and that
of poor agents yp0 =
1−θ0
1−δ , where I assume that θ0 > δ.
Suppose that aggregate wealth in this economy grows at the known constant rate φ ≥ 0
in each period, i.e., aggregate wealth follows the law of motion yt+1 = (1 + φ)yt. I define
the aggregate surplus in period t to be St := yt − yt−1 = φ · yt−1. Rich agents capture
fraction αt ∈ [0, 1] of the aggregate surplus, leaving fraction 1−αt for poor agents. Hence,












(1− θt) + φ(1− αt)




1− δ yt, (2)





which is constant if and only if αt = θt.
Consider the following stage game played during each period t ∈ N among generation-
t agents. Elites control the political process and modes of production and therefore set
αt ∈ [0, 1] in each period. I abstract from the hold-up problem, so that even if rich agents
14Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), I refer to the former group interchangeably as “rich agents”
or “elites.”
15Formally, this also assumes that agents within each group have solved their collective action problem
and are able to coordinate on the same action.
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move first they can commit to this level of surplus division.16 Once αt is announced, poor
agents choose whether to accept the offer and allow production to proceed, or to stage a
revolution. In the case of revolt, a fraction µ ∈ (0, 1) of the economy’s period t output
is destroyed, and poor agents take permanent control of the remaining wealth. After a
revolution in period t+ 1, which I denote by R(t),17 wealth evolves as
yps(R(t)) =
1− µ
1− δ · (1 + φ)yt
and
yrs(R(t)) = 0
for all s ≥ t + 1. The interpretation is that, after a revolution, poor agents divide the
total stock of wealth evenly among each other and rich agents are left with nothing.18
These allocations persist for all future periods. I now characterize the (essentially) unique
equilibrium of this stage game.
Lemma 1: There exists an essentially unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this
stage game. Given a level of inequality θt−1 from the previous period, the equilibrium level
of surplus division is α∗t =
(1+φ)µ−θt−1
φ ≥ 0 if feasible. Revolution occurs if and only if the
non-negativity constraint does not bind.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma leads immediately to the following result.
16If elites chose α and poor agents chose whether to revolt simultaneously, there would (for large enough
φ) be multiple Nash equilibria, since the normal form game would have a coordination structure. One
class of equilibria would have low redistribution (which only needs to be below some critical threshold)
and revolt; the other class would consist of a single equilibrium with high redistribution and no revolt. In
the extensive form game described here, I can effectively select either of these classes through the timing
of moves. In particular, if elites move first and have commitment power, they will optimally choose to
redistribute to the point where poor agents do not revolt; revolt will not occur by sequential rationality. If
poor agents move first, they will revolt unless it is sequentially rational for elites to redistribute after the
revolution threat has subsided. Since in this example one-period lives imply that elites will never have an
incentive to redistribute ex-post, I let them move first.
17Throughout, I use upper case letters to refer to states and actions. Lower case letters are reserved to
index agent types. This is to avoid confusion between R (revolt) and r (rich agent or elite).
18That elites get exactly zero wealth after revolution is not important. All that is needed for the results
of this paper to hold is that elites strictly prefer redistribution to revolution.
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Proposition 1: Given any initial level of inequality θ0 ≤ µ and for any φ ≥ 0, revo-
lution never occurs and θt = µ ∀t ∈ N. Given any initial level of inequality θ0 > µ, there
is never revolution and θt = µ ∀t ∈ N if and only if φ ≥ φ¯, where φ¯ solves (1 + φ¯) = θ0µ .
For any φ ∈ [0, φ¯), revolution in the first period is unavoidable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition is the simplest possible way of capturing the fact that economic growth
– and particularly the prospect that this growth will enrich all members of society – can
mitigate social and political conflict. Even for high initial levels of inequality and low costs
of revolt,19 the coupling of rapid growth and frictionless redistributive channels allows
for social tensions to remain latent, with revolution never occurring on the equilibrium
path. The intuition is as follows. Revolution can be avoided if and only if there exists a
feasible transfer that induces ypt ≥ ypt (R(t)) (which is equivalent to the condition in Lemma
1). When inequality is high (θ > µ), such a transfer needs to be large for this incentive
constraint to hold. But the size of the maximal feasible transfer is increasing in the growth
rate, because higher rates of growth increase St, the period-t aggregate surplus.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to extending this insight to more realistic set-
tings. First, agents in this example only live for one period. The results obtained therefore
neglect the effects of growth compounded over many periods. When agents optimize over
longer time horizons, the sensitivity of growth to the revolution decision plays an impor-
tant role in poor agents’ incentives to revolt. Second, the growth rate in this example is
constant in time. In reality, people’s decisions are heavily influenced by their expectations
about their future economic prospects. When the economic environment is weak, there
is often uncertainty about how long it will take to recover to a period of robust growth.
Hence, it would be desirable for a more complete model to include this kind of uncertainty.
Third, the surplus division technology is completely frictionless in this example. In reality,
transfers often cannot be completely directed. More importantly, political institutions that
give the elites full de jure political power inherently lead to commitment problems. As Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2000, 2002, 2006) have emphasized, the ability to commit to future
redistribution provides a powerful rationale for elites to voluntary establish democracy in
some cases. I study how economic conditions mitigate or exacerbate these commitment
issues. Fourth, this example assumed that all agents in the economy accumulate wealth at
the same rate, which is not empirically accurate (Benabou (1996), Galor and Zeira (1993),
19See the discussion in Section 4 for more on the interpretation of these costs.
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Piketty (2014)). Introducing variable accumulation rates lets me study how inequality and
social tensions evolve along the development path. In the subsequent sections, I take up
each of these extensions in turn, showing that the main insight generated by this simple
example – that economic growth can mitigate conflict – continues to hold in more realistic
settings.
3 The dynamic model
Consider an infinite horizon variant of the model from Section 2, where now agents live
for all t ∈ N and discount the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). Agents are risk neutral so that
expected lifetime utility starting in period t for an agent of type i ∈ {r, p} is





where Ft is the public history at time t and his is type i’s period s wealth. The public
history contains the entire sequence of previous and present aggregate states (described
below) and all past actions by elites and poor agents. Formally, Ft = st ∪ {(sr,~ar)}t−1r=0,
where ~at is the action profile realized in period t.
20
In each period, the economy is in one of two aggregate states – high (H) or low (L)
– and evolves according to the following Markov process. Given knowledge of the current
state, the conditional probability that the economy will be in the high aggregate state in
the subsequent period is
Pr(st+1 = H|st) =
qH , if st = H1− qL, if st = L
and the economy transitions to the low state with complementary probabilities
20Throughout the paper, I abstract from the consumption/saving decision. It would be straightforward
to introduce an exogenous saving rate and define utility over consumption streams. Value functions would
then be concave in the savings rate (Benabou (1996)). However, this extension does not add much to
the present analysis – all statements made here about the growth rate would simply be translated into
statements about the product of the growth rate and savings rate. Modeling agents as Ramsey consumers
and solving for their optimal consumption plans would significantly complicate the analysis, and I do not
attempt to do so here. See, e.g., Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) for a suggestive example.
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Pr(st+1 = L|st) =
1− qH , if st = HqL, if st = L
so that qst gives the persistence of state st ∈ {L,H}. Expectations are taken with respect
to the distribution induced by this process.21
While the focus of the paper is on an economy with aggregate growth, it is easiest to
begin by analyzing an analogous endowment economy without accumulation. This allows
me to obtain clean closed-form solutions; I then show that the same qualitative features
hold in the economy with growth. In the endowment economy, agents are endowed each
period with type-specific wealth hi, i ∈ {p, r}, which fully depreciates before the start of the
next period.22 As in Section 2, these can be written as hr = θδ and h
p = 1−θ1−δ , with θ > δ.
Let H = δhr+(1−δ)hp be the total amount of capital in the economy. The interpretation is
now that hi is wealth is measured in ownership of a productive asset, which I call “capital”
for concreteness.23 Assume that capital is the only input in production, which is carried
out individually.
There are two sectors in which production can take place, one formal and one informal,
where the former is more productive. In particular, the marginal product of capital in the
informal sector is B ≥ 1 in both states, and the marginal product in the formal sector is
state-dependent and given by AH = (1+φ)B and AL = B, where φ > 0.
24 Assume further
that the informal sector is not taxable, but that both sectors are vulnerable to other types
of expropriation. The maximum tax rate in each state is given by τˆH =
φ
1+φ and τˆL = 0, so
that in “boom” times greater redistribution is possible.25 Tax revenues are rebated lump
sum to the entire population. Denote these rebates by Tt. I assume that the government
must balance the budget in each period, so that Tt =
∫
Ft
τthjdj, where j ∈ Ft denotes that
21Refer to the proof of Proposition 5 for a more formal definition.
22In this case, post-production wealth can be interpreted as consumption levels without considering any
savings choice.
23As Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002) note, this may be best thought of as a composition of physical
and human capital. This broader interpretation is consistent with the literature on growth with incomplete
capital markets (e.g., Benabou (1996); Galor and Zeira (1993)) and the recent findings of Murten and
Wacziarg (2013) on the education-democracy correlation.
24The normalization AL = B and hence τˆL = 0 is for convenience. If AL < B, all production would
move to the informal sector in any case. Qualitative results would not change if AH > AL > B, but the
calculations become messier.
25These maximal rates solve (1 − τst)Ast = B. If τt > τˆst , all production moves to the informal sector
and tax revenues are zero, which can never be optimal from a redistributive perspective.
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agent j ∈ [0, 1] has his capital committed to the formal sector in period t. For τt ≤ τˆst ,
Ft = [0, 1] (up to sets of measure zero) so total revenues (which are equivalent to per capita
rebates with the population normalized to size one) are Tt = τt ·H.
I emphasize that the distribution technology need not – and probably should not – be
literally interpreted as taxation on income or capital gains. It is simply a way of allocat-
ing economic gains between the two groups that is controlled by the group with political
power. I use a flat rate tax because it facilitates direct comparison with the models of
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002, 2006).26 The restriction to non-targeted transfers is
also technically convenient, as it reduces the dimensionality of the policy space and lets
me invoke the Median Voter Theorem. It is worth collecting some observations about the
technical properties of this technology.
Remark 1: Let (τst , Tst) be as described above. Then the redistribution technology has
the following properties.
1. When st = H and there is no accumulation, the minimum post-tax wealth left for rich
agents (before rebates) is hr,mint = B · hrt . When there is accumulation and B = 1,
this quantity becomes hr,mint = h
r
t−1. That is, the instruments allow only for income-
(as opposed to wealth-) redistribution.
2. When there is accumulation, in the notation of Section 2, the smallest income share
that goes to the elites is αmint > 0. This follows from the fact that transfers are not
targeted. When there is no accumulation, an analogous result obtains if I redefine the
aggregate surplus as S′t = Ht(H) −Ht(L), where Ht(st) is aggregate output in state
st.
3. Because I abstract from intertemporal optimization over consumption and savings,
taxes do not distort investment decisions.
The first observation preserves the structure of the technology from Section 2 in that only
(a fraction of) current period output can be redistributed. One can clearly envision transfer
schemes in which previously-accumulated wealth is redistributed. A prime example of this
type of scheme is the land reforms that took place in post-war Japan (see, e.g., Alesina
and Rodrik (1994)). These kinds of transfers typically occur either (1) during a violent
26Refer to the commentary in the next section for further interpretation.
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revolution or regime change or (2) as a product of dramatic nation-wide reforms. The latter
instance corresponds to the case of post-war Japan. In this paper, I restrict attention to
the first instance.27 The latter two observations are self-evident.
In each period (assuming revolution has not yet occurred), the timeline is as follows:
1. The current state st ∈ Ft is revealed.
2. The current tax rate τt is set, after which capital is committed to production.
3. Poor agents decide whether to initiate a revolution, which, if undertaken, succeeds
with probability one.
4. Returns to production are realized and distributed accordingly.
With this framework in place, I proceed to define and characterize equilibria in this
economy.
4 Equilibrium characterization
I restrict attention throughout to pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria, which henceforth
are simply referred to as “equilibria.” This simplification drastically reduces the equilib-
rium set relative to subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by eliminating history dependence.
Indeed, for a given set of parameters and sequence of realized states s = {st}∞t=0, there will
always be an essentially unique equilibrium in this economy. The stationarity of Marko-
vian equilibria also allows me to utilize elementary dynamic programming arguments to
characterize this equilibrium throughout.28 Formally, equilibria are classified by the group
in political power and are defined as follows.
Definition 1: A (pure strategy Markov perfect) equilibrium (under elite control) is a pair of
mappings σp : {st, θt, Ht, τt} → {revolt, no revolt} and σr : {st, θt, Ht} → {τ ∈ [0, τˆst ],∆}
so that ∀t ∈ N, V pt (σp, σr) ≥ V pt (σ˜p, σr) and V rt (σp, σr) ≥ V rt (σp, σ˜r) for all alternative
27This is largely a matter of interpretation. While I do not consider the problem of a government choosing
among various types of institutional reform, the payoffs under revolution can just as well be interpreted as
the payoffs after a set of redistributive reforms. In this case, µ ∈ (0, 1) would represent the deadweight loss
due to wealth reallocation.
28Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002, 2006) emphasize the appeal of the Markovian restriction for
its natural representation of commitment problems in political economy. This interpretation becomes
important when I discuss incentives for democratization later.
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mappings σ˜i, i ∈ {p, r}.
The payoff-relevant state variables in this economy are (1) the current aggregate state
st, (2) the level of wealth inequality θt, and (3) the aggregate wealth level Ht. When elites
control the political process, their strategy space consists of all (measurable) mappings
from the vector of state variables to a feasible tax rate τ and a democratization decision ∆.
Without loss of generality, let ∆ = 1 denote democratization and ∆ = 0 denote that elites
hold onto political power. Strategies for poor agents are similarly (measurable) mappings
from the vector of state variables and, assuming ∆ = 0, the announced tax rate. If ∆ = 1
in any period s ≤ t, the strategies are defined as follows.
Definition 2: A (pure strategy Markov perfect) equilibrium (under democracy) is a pair
of mappings σp : {st, θt, Ht} → τ ∈ [0, τˆst ] and σr : {st, θt, Ht} → ∅ so that ∀t ∈ N,
V pt (σ
p, σr) ≥ V pt (σ˜p, σr) and V rt (σp, σr) ≥ V rt (σp, σ˜r) for all alternative mappings σ˜i, i ∈
{p, r}.
In democracy, the poor agents hold political power and set their optimal tax rate. Elites,
out of political power, are restricted to null actions.
The strategy spaces are simple, and optimal play can be determined by a small set of
incentive constraints. Since these incentive constraints are more intuitive than statements
about strategies, the remainder of my results will only reference the constraints. The for-
mal translations are obvious. In particular, I need the following definitions.
Definition 3: I say that “revolution occurs in state st ∈ {L,H} at time t” if it is strictly
optimal for poor agents to stage revolution in response to any feasible sequence of transfers
{τs}∞s=t. Denote this event by R(st, t).
Definition 4: I say that “the revolution constraint binds in state st ∈ {L,H} at time
t” if it is strictly optimal for poor agents to stage revolution, conditional on all present and
future transfers being exactly zero: τs = 0 ∀s ≥ t.
Definition 5: I say that “democratization occurs in state st ∈ {L,H} at time t” if it
is strictly optimal for elites to democratize, conditional on optimal response by the poor
agents.
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Once I have characterized the appropriate value functions, it is easy to see how these
three definitions translate directly into incentive constraints (inequalities between the value
functions) and therefore equilibrium strategies.
The following fact should be clear just from the definitions, but I state it here so that
there is no ambiguity going forward. The first part is trivial; the second follows from the
Median Voter Theorem and the fact that the policy space is one-dimensional.
Lemma 3: Under elite control, τt = 0 unless the revolution constraint binds at (st, t).
Under democracy, τt = τˆst ∀t ∈ N.
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, I consider the endowment economy without
growth described in Section 3. This allows for a sharp, time-independent characterization
of the relevant constraints. Second, I add accumulation to the model in the natural way.
In this context, I discuss ergodic properties of the economy, inequality dynamics, and the
transition to and stability of democracy.
4.1 An economy without accumulation
Without accumulation, income shares of the rich and poor are time invariant. Therefore,
revolution occurs (in any period t) if and only if it occurs immediately. Moreover, since I
have assumed that elites receive payoffs of zero under revolution, it is always optimal to
fend off revolution through maximally redistributive taxes, if feasible.
Let Vˆ pst denote the value function for poor agents in state st ∈ {L,H} when there is
maximal redistribution. These value functions will be used to determine whether revolution
can be avoided through transfers. It is clear that these value functions must satisfy the
recursive equations













L + (1− qL)Vˆ pH
]
. (6)
Note that, once the definitions of AH and τˆH are substituted in to Equation (5), the only
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term that explicitly depends on φ is the middle term τˆHAHH = φBH. This is explained
as follows. Each agent taxed to the point where his productivity is B, which is the same as
in the low state. In the high state, however, there are positive tax revenues that increase
with φ. This is where one needs to be somewhat careful with the strict interpretation that
redistribution works through taxation and government transfers. In many macroeconomic
models, the optimal tax scheme is procyclical, which is the case here by virtue of the
participation constraint (1 − τ)AH ≥ B. But a large class of macroeconomic models
also suggests that deficit spending (fiscal stimulus) is optimal during recessions, which I
have explicitly ruled out of the model by assuming that the government has a perfectly
balanced budget in each period. For this reason, it is more palatable to abstract from
government as a standalone third party and hence from taxation as described above. But
the abstract surplus division scheme from Section 2 illustrates that the effects of growth on
the revolution decision has nothing a priori to do with taxes. The only important features
are: (1) there is more surplus to be divided in the high state, and (2) redistribution is more
difficult in the low state due to frictions inherent in the surplus division technology.


























1 + β(1− qL − qH) > 0. (9)
Observe that this difference does not depend on the inequality parameter θ but is strictly
increasing in both persistence probabilities qH and qL. In particular, both value functions
are strictly decreasing in qL, but Vˆ
P
L decreases faster. Similarly, both value functions are
strictly increasing in qH and Vˆ
P
H increases faster.
Similarly, let V p(st, h
p, τ ≡ 0) denote the poor agents’ value functions when there is zero
redistribution in the present and in all future periods. These will be used in characterizing
29See the Appendix for proof.
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the revolution constraint. These must satisfy the recursive equations
V p(H,hp, τ ≡ 0) = (1+φ) ·B ·hp+βqHV p(H,hp, τ ≡ 0)+β(1−qH)V p(L, hp, τ ≡ 0) (10)
and
V p(L, hp, τ ≡ 0) = B · hp + βqLV p(L, hp, τ ≡ 0) + β(1− qL)V p(H,hp, τ ≡ 0). (11)
Solving (10) and (11) together yields




1 + φ+ β(1− (1 + φ)qL − qH)
1 + β(1− qL − qH) (12)
and




1 + β((1− qL)(1 + φ)− qH)
1 + β(1− qL − qH) , (13)
and it is easily verified that V p(H,hp, τ ≡ 0) > V p(L, hp, τ ≡ 0). However, an ordering on
Vˆ pL and V
p(H,hp, τ ≡ 0) is not completely immediate. Straightforward algebra yields that
Vˆ pL > V
p(H,hp, τ ≡ 0) ⇐⇒ β(1− qL)
1− βqL >
1− θ
1− δ . (14)
This is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: If inequality is sufficiently high (θ ≈ 1) or agents are sufficiently patient
(β ≈ 1), maximal redistribution ∀t starting in the low state is better for poor agents than
zero redistribution ∀t starting in the high state. This never holds when the low state is very
persistent (qL ≈ 1).
Proof. Immediate from Equation (14).
This result is intuitive. When agents are very patient, they internalize the gains from
redistribution in the high state, even if it is in the distant future. Similarly, when the low
state is perfectly persistent, the high state is never again realized, so the former effect is
nullified. When inequality is very high, it is feasible to have relatively large transfers in
the future, since the proportion of the tax base comprised of rich agents is large. Which
way the inequality runs does not have an appreciable effect on equilibrium play.
I can then restate Definitions 3 and 4 as follows.
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Definition 3’: Revolution occurs in state st ∈ {L,H} at time t iff V P (R(st, t)) > Vˆ pst.
Definition 4’: The revolution constraint binds in state st ∈ {L,H} at time t iff V P (R(st, t)) >
V p(H,hp, τ ≡ 0).
Below, I consider the implications of two different assumptions about the productivity
implications of revolution, each of which captures different aspects of the revolution deci-
sion. Although I use the first case for the remainder of the paper (this is formally stated in
Assumption 1 below), it is useful to understand when alternative results are obtained, their
connection with the extant literature, and arguments against their empirical relevance.
4.1.1 Case 1 (State-Independent Constraints):
Assume that, once revolution takes place, the economy never again enters the high pro-







V r(R) = 0 (16)
independently of the current state.30 Note that these are analogous to the payoffs under
revolution in Section 2, but in perpetuity.
The following proposition characterizes when revolution is imminent. For concision, I
say that an event is “more likely” if it holds for a larger set of parameter values.
Proposition 2: When the payoffs to revolution are state-independent,





2. For all parameter values R(H) =⇒ R(L), i.e., revolution in the low state is always
more likely.
3. R(L) and R(H) both become less likely as: φ increases, qH increases, and qL de-
creases.
30I suppress the time- and state-dependence in the revolution term when it does not cause confusion.
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4. R(L) becomes less likely as β increases, while R(H) becomes more likely.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result extends the intuitions from Proposition 1 to the present dynamic environ-
ment. As in Section 2, even for high inequality (θ > µ), there exists a critical productivity
level φ∗ > 0 such that revolution is avoided in both states for all φ ≥ φ∗. Moreover,
revolution is always more likely in the low state, as poor agents’ prospects of benefitting
from growth are delayed at least one period. Similarly, the expectation of sustained growth
(a high qH) makes revolution less likely in both states, while the prospect of a prolonged
downturn (a high qL) increases the likelihood of revolution. The comparative statics with
respect to the discount factor are also intuitively appealing. When in the low state, in-
creased patience allows agents to look forward to good times in the future, and these
positive prospects work to mitigate the revolution threat. In contrast, in the high state
patient agents internalize the transience of the present windfall – i.e., hard times in the
future loom larger. In the limit of perfect patience β → 1, the constraints are equivalent.
It is also useful to think about the implications of state persistence for the incidence of
revolution.
Corollary 1: Let qH = qL = q. Then R(L) becomes more likely and the R(H) becomes
less likely as q increases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This confirms the basic intuition that increased persistence is good in the high state
and bad in the low state. In particular, since this comparative static exercise varies both
persistence probabilities in the same way, higher persistence means that the economy is
more “locked in” to the current state. To sharpen this characterization, it is useful to
define the following quantities.
Definition 5: φ∗s := inf{φ ∈ R+| not R(s) ∀(µ, θ) ∈ [0, 1]2} for s ∈ {L,H}.31
Given the incentive constraints for the events R(s) in Proposition 2, it clearly suffices to find
the numbers φ∗s so that each of the constraints binds as an equality for (µ, θ) = (0, 1). This
31I do not specify whether the events R(s) correspond to state-dependent or state-independent constraints
whenever the context is clear.
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cost-inequality pair is the most extreme one feasible: revolution is costless for poor agents,
and rich agents hold all of the economy’s wealth. In this case, poor agents’ only source
of income is lump-sum transfers from the elites. Because the volume of redistribution in
a given period depends on the productivity differential between the low and high state φ,
this differential must be large enough to satisfy the poor agents’ incentive constraints. The
following proposition characterizes the dependence of the φ∗s on the persistence probabili-
ties qs.
Proposition 3: As qL → 1, φ∗L → ∞ and φ∗H → 1−βqH(1−δ)(1−β) > 11−δ . As qH → 1,




H → 11−δ > 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
These qualitative results are appealing. In the case that the low state is arbitrarily
persistent (qL → 1), no amount of productivity in the high state (which will never be
realized) can ward off revolution for all cost-inequality pairs. Indeed, when qL = 1, R(L)
occurs if and only if θ > µ, which is the “static no-growth” revolution condition familiar
from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). In the case that the high state is arbitrarily persistent
(qH → 1), the maximal lump-sum tax is TˆH = δ1−δ · Bhr when φ = φ∗H . In words, each
poor agent (and rich agent) receives a transfer that is as if each elite gave Bhr – his entire
production less the productivity premium from being in the high state – to the group of
poor agents, of which there are 1− δ. This is precisely the per-period income of each poor
agent under revolution when costs vanish. Not surprisingly, both φ∗L in the limit qH → 1
and φ∗H in the limit qL → 1 are larger than this, which reflects, respectively, a premium
for waiting for “good times” and a premium for falling permanently onto “bad times.”
From a quantitative perspective, all of these limits are very large. In particular, if
B = 1 so that there are no gains to production in the low state, Proposition 3 says that
production in the high state must more than double one’s wealth to avoid revolution when
inequality is very high and revolt is nearly costless.
4.1.2 Case 2 (State-Dependent Constraints):
Now assume that the Markov process governing the economy’s aggregate productivity is
not effected by the revolution decision. It is easily verified that the poor agents’ value
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1 + β(1− qL − qH)
]
, (18)
where it is clear that V P (R(H)) > V P (R(L)) from the second term in square brackets.
It is then easy to verify that
R(s) ⇐⇒
θ − µ > (µ− δ) ·
φ(1−βqL)
1+β(1−qL−qH) , if s = H
θ − µ > (µ− δ) · φβ(1−qL)1+β(1−qL−qH) , if s = L
so that the relative strength of either condition depends on whether δ > µ or µ > δ. This
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: When the payoffs to revolution are state-dependent,
• High costs (µ > δ): Both constraints are strictly stronger than the no-growth rev-
olution constraint θ > µ. Moreover, R(H) =⇒ R(L) and the same comparative
statics as in Proposition 2 obtain.
• Low costs (µ < δ): Both constraints are strictly weaker than the no-growth revolu-
tion constraint θ > µ, but never hold for µ ≥ θ. Moreover, R(L) =⇒ R(H) and the
comparative statics are opposite those in Proposition 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Whether 1−µ1−δ is greater than one (low costs) or less than one (high costs) is crucial for
poor agents’ incentives to expropriate the capital stock. Intuitively, if this ratio is less than
one, the per-capita gains to revolution are small in the sense that each poor agent receives
less than one unit32 of the aggregate capital – i.e., there is a high level of dispersion of the
capital stock among the poor population. If the ratio is larger than one, the per capita
gains are relatively larger.
32Of course, I really mean that the (Lebesgue) measure of each poor agents’ share of the aggregate stock
H is less than one, since capital is perfectly divisible and agents are atomistic.
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4.1.3 The argument for Case 1
When should one expect either case to hold? First, in accordance with Acemoglu and
Robinson’s (2000) interpretation, let µ denote the real costs of coordinating, which is
necessary for the poor agents to overcome the collective action problem and initiate a
successful revolution.33 If one accepts the Olsonian notion that larger groups are harder
to coordinate (see Olson (1971)), then µ should increase with the size of the lower class.
Formally, let µ˜ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a strictly decreasing and continuous bijection, so that
the cost of coordinating µ˜(δ) strictly increases with the size of the lower class. With these
assumptions, there clearly exists a unique δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
µ˜(δ)
> δ, if δ < δ∗≤ δ, if δ ≥ δ∗.
In words, for societies with a sufficiently large lower class, the coordination costs of revo-
lution are sufficiently high to make comparative statics with state-dependent payoffs work
in the same direction as those in Proposition 2.
On the other hand, if the cost µ does not depend on the relative class sizes – e.g., if µ is
a measure of rule of law, with higher µ corresponding to better property rights and hence
higher costs of expropriation – this argument fails, and the case δ > µ may be relevant.
The relative strength of the revolution conditions – namely, that revolution is more likely
in the high state – is then comparable to “the voracity effect” in Tornell and Lane (1999),
whereby positive shocks induce greater conflict over resources.34 Intuitively, if costs to
revolution are vanishingly small, it is always better to immediately grab the “bigger pie”
when in the high state rather than accept the lump sum rebate TˆH that is distributed
among all agents, both rich and poor.
The assumption that the high state is never realized after revolution (Case 1) can be
interpreted in a few ways. First, this formulation captures the notion that revolution is
inherently harmful to productivity and growth. This could be for many reasons. For ex-
ample, if the high productivity states are correlated with episodes of high levels of foreign
investment or trade, it is reasonable to expect that civil conflict will cause foreign busi-
nesses to retreat. Similarly, law and order are likely to remain unenforced during periods
of radical political transition, which would disincentive new investment and lower the pro-
33See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for a discussion of microfoundations.
34See also Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and Benabou (1996).
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ductivity of existing ones. All of these effects are consistent with the evidence on growth
collapses outlined in Rodrik (1999) and and decreased investment during periods of polit-
ical turbulence in Alesina and Perotti (1996). Second, this formulation can be understood
as a statement about the managerial abilities of the poor agents. Even absent any of the
distortions mentioned above, it is reasonable to think that existing capital and technology
would be utilized less efficiently by poor agents. This justification is most compelling when
the poor “masses” are relatively uneducated, e.g., at low levels of economic development.
Remark 2: In the case of state-dependent constraints, limiting results analogous to those
in Proposition 3 do not hold. Even restricting µ ∈ [δ, 1] implies that φ∗s = ∞ for both
states. This is because the value functions under revolution are now affine in φ, and hence
scale without bound like the value functions under maximal redistribution. This is a useful
observation, as it makes clear that the finite limits in Proposition 3 result from the oppor-
tunity cost (in terms of foregone lump-sum transfers) of revolution, which in that case is
unbounded in φ.
Remark 3: I show in the Appendix that these state-dependent results are not robust to
perturbations in the following sense. Assume that, after revolution, the economy falls into
the low state for T − 1 periods. In the T th period, the Markov chain “picks up where it
left off:” if revolution occurred in period t∗ when st∗ = H, then Pr(st∗+T = H) = qH (and
analogously for the low state). Then, it is easy to show that if 1 > δ+βT−1, all qualitative
features are as in Propositions 2 and 3, and there is no problem sending µ→ 0.
As the comparative statics in Proposition 2 and the limit results in Proposition 3 seem
realistic, and since reality is likely in between the state-independent and state-dependent
cases as in Remark 3, I adopt the following assumption throughout the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1: Payoffs to revolution are state-independent.
4.2 An economy with accumulation and output growth
The only difference now is that I assume wealth does not depreciate between periods.




(1 + φ)ht, if st+1 = Hht, if st+1 = L,
where for simplicity I normalize B ≡ 1 so that there is exactly zero growth in the low state.
It is easy to verify that the stationary distribution of the economy’s transition matrix,








(mH ,mL) = (
1− qL
2− qH − qL ,
1− qH
2− qH − qL ),
where ms denotes the “average” fraction of time that the economy spends in state s.
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Hence, the long-run average growth rate36 gˆ is given by
1 + gˆ = 1 +mHφ.
Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), which built on the seminal work of Galor
and Zeira (1993), I assume a non-convexity in the accumulation technology.37 Specifically,
there exists X > 0 such that if ht < X, then ht+1 = ht regardless of the aggregate state.




1 + φθt < 1 + φ, if st+1 = H1, if st+1 = L ,
which is monotone increasing and unbounded. As before, θt =
δhrt
Ht
gives a measure of
inequality at time t. Using this equation and observing that accumulation among the
elites implies Ht+1θt+1 = (1 + φ) ·Htθt, it is easy to see that inequality follows the law of
35This “average” should be thought of as a sample average over infinitely many sample economies. That
his notion coincides with the definition above follows from the (pointwise) ergodic theorem.
36This is assuming that all agents are accumulating – see below.
37Benabou (1996) develops an alternative method to model the aggregate effects of such credit constraints,







> θt, if st+1 = H
θt, if st+1 = L,
where the first difference equation has fixed points θ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
As shown in Section 4.1 for an endowment economy, large values of φ in the high state
can prevent revolution even with a great deal of inequality. With growth, if poor agents are
unable to accumulate, large φ results in rapidly growing inequality, bringing the revolution
threat closer to the present. The objective of this section is to analyze how these two forces
interact.
The first step is to characterize the relevant value functions. Let V i(s, hit, τt) denote the
time t value function for an agent of type i who inherits wealth hit from the previous period
and who is taxed at rate τt after production takes place. Let V
i(s, hit, τ ≡ 0) be the value
function when τs = 0 ∀s ≥ t. (The only difference from the case without accumulation is
that now the value functions are time-varying.)
The following assumption is needed to ensure that things are well defined.
Assumption 3: 1 > β(1 + φ).
This assumption says that the economy does not grow fast enough (relative to discounting)
to make lifetime utility explode.38
The following lemma then gives part of the desired characterization.
Lemma 5: Let Assumption 3 hold. When there is zero redistribution in all future pe-
riods, the value functions are given by
V i(s, hit, τ ≡ 0) =
hit
1− β , if h
i
t < X, s ∈ {L,H},
V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0) =
hit · (1 + φ) · [1− β(qH − (1− qL))]
1− βqL(1− β(1 + φ))− β(1− β)qH(1 + φ)− β2(1 + φ) , if h
i
t ≥ X,
38Weaker conditions are possible, but this ensures well-defined value functions for all (qH , qL) ∈ [0, 1] ×
[0, 1]. See the proof of Lemma 5 for details.
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and
V i(L, hit, τ ≡ 0) =
hit · [1− β(1 + φ)(qH − (1− qL))]




• V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0) > V i(L, hit, τ ≡ 0)
• ∂V i(H,hit,τ≡0)∂φ > ∂V
i(L,hit,τ≡0)
∂φ > 0




• 0 > ∂V i(H,hit,τ≡0)∂qL >
∂V i(L,hit,τ≡0)
∂qL
• ∂V i(H,hit,τ≡0)∂β > ∂V
i(L,hit,τ≡0)
∂β > 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, using Assumption 1 it is easy to see that the value function for poor agents staging






where Ht = δh
r
t + (1 − δ)hpt . If hp0 < X ≤ hr0 and there are no transfers, clearly positive
growth implies the existence of t∗ ∈ N such that V p(R(t)) > V p(s, hpt , τ ≡ 0) if and only
if t ≥ t∗ and where hps = hp0 ∀s < t∗. That is, aggregate growth and different rates of ac-
cumulation between socioeconomic groups implies that the revolution constraint will bind
in finite time (except for a corner case). The following lemma documents this observation.
The expectation operator E~m is taken with respect to the measure induced by the ergodic
distribution (mH ,mL).
Lemma 6: Let hp0 < X and 1 > µ ≥ θ0 > 0. If qL < 1, then E~m(t∗) < ∞ and is
decreasing in φ, qH , and 1− qL. If qL = 1, E~m(t∗) =∞.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The (pointwise) Ergodic Theorem tells us that the same results obtain if we were to
take sample averages over (arbitrarily large subsets of) a sequence of identical economies
{ei}i∈N. I emphasize that the cutoff time t∗ should not be interpreted as calendar time.
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Rather, it should be interpreted as the length of time since the economy began to experience
“modern” (i.e., industrial or post-industrial) growth.
The next thing that needs to be determined is whether a one-period transfer can push
poor agents’ wealth over the threshold X so that they can accumulate in future periods.
If yes, inequality will decrease, and with no subsequent transfers, will stay at this level for
all time. Inequality will of course decrease again if any subsequent transfers are made.
If st = L, only null transfers can be made, so poor agents remain below the accumulation
threshold. If st = H, poor agents remain unable to accumulate if and only if
(1− τˆ) · hpt + τˆ ·Ht < X,
which, recalling the law of motion for aggregate wealth, that hpt = h
p
0, and the definition






·Ht−1 · [1 + φθt−1] < X.
The following fact is immediate from the observation that the second term on the left is
unbounded in φ and Ht−1.39
Lemma 7: Suppose hp0 < X, st = H, and no transfers have been made prior to date
t. Then,
• For all X, τ,Ht−1 > 0 and θt−1 ∈ [0, 1], there exists φˆ > 0 such that φ ≥ φˆ implies
that poor agents can begin to accumulate in period t.
• For all X, τ, φ > 0 and θt−1 ∈ [0, 1], there exists Hˆ > 0 such that Ht−1 ≥ Hˆ implies
that poor agents can begin to accumulate in period t.
In words, in the good state (so that positive transfers are feasible), poor agents with
arbitrarily few assets can begin to accumulate if either growth or aggregate wealth is large
enough. In this sense, wealth levels and the rate of wealth growth are substitutes.
The following proposition gives a partial characterization of when a society can avoid
revolution, given that poor agents have not yet been able to accumulate. The focus is on
one-time transfers and limiting cases, since these are the easiest to deal with and have clear
39That the poor are taxed despite getting zero net returns on production is not totally consistent with
the reasoning that led to the maximal tax rates τˆst, but the calculations are somewhat cleaner in this case.
All the following results continue to hold if the poor are not taxed when they cannot accumulate.
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intuitive meaning. By the Markovian assumptions on strategies and the aggregate state
transition matrix, it is sufficient to suppose t = 0.
Proposition 5: Let Assumption 3 hold, let hp0 < X < h
r
0 < H0 be given, and suppose
that V p(R(0)) > V p(s, hp0, τ ≡ 0). Then,
1. If s0 = L, then for all φ > 0 there exists q
∗
L ∈ (0, 1) such that qL > q∗L =⇒ R(0).
That is, no transfer scheme can avoid immediate revolution.
2. If s0 = H, there exists φ
∗ > 0 such that φ ∈ [0, φ∗) =⇒ R(0). That is, no transfer
scheme can avoid immediate revolution.











(0, 1)× (0, 1) such that revolution occurs immediately if qH < q∗H and qL > q∗L.




1+φ(1 + φθ0)H0 ≥ 1−µ1−δ · H0, revolution in the current
period can be avoided but poor agents remain unable to accumulate. This is possible
only if µ > δ and β is sufficiently small. Revolution is then avoided in the subsequent
period without additional transfers if and only if µ ≥ θ1 = θ01+φθ0 +
δφ
1+φ , which can
hold only if θ0 and µ are sufficiently large.
5. If s0 = H and agents are sufficiently impatient (β ≈ 0), then for all qH ∈ [0, 1] there
exists φ∗ > 0 such that φ ≥ φ∗ =⇒ revolution never occurs when transfers are only
for one period.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The first three cases yield pessimistic conclusions about social conflict in unequal societies
with stagnant economies. Case (1) should be interpreted as follows. Consider an economy
with a potentially very high growth rate that has succumbed to a period of stagnation.
This could be due to, e.g., sectoral stagnation, an externally-induced growth collapse, or
an sharp business cycle downturn that induces enough uncertainty to make agents unsure
about whether it will ever be escaped.40 This part of the proposition says that, if agents
believe that bad times will be very persistent, no amount of potential growth can relieve
immediate social tensions. Case (2) is similar, but applies to economies in which the
40An example of an externally-induced growth collapse is the breakdown of relations with a major trading
partner. Regarding the final possibility, I explicitly introduce uncertainty in a later section.
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maximum potential growth is very low. Finally, Case (3) says that moderate but transient
windfalls are not sufficient to mitigate the revolution threat.
The latter two cases represent the main theme of this paper – that rapid growth can
relieve social tensions. In Case (4), growth is high enough to relieve the immediate revo-
lution threat, but not high enough to allow poor agents to begin accumulation. If initial
inequality is high enough, this may be enough to prevent revolution in the subsequent
period even without additional transfers. Finally, Case (5) says that, even if growth is
transitory, if it large enough it can prevent the revolution threat for the rest of time. This
happens because maximal transfers relax the immediate revolution threat while simulta-
neously pushing poor agents over the accumulation threshold. Therefore, absent future
transfers, inequality will remain constant in future periods because both classes of agents
accumulate at the same rate.41
5 Commitment and democratization
I have thus far abstracted from commitment problems. The elite were assumed, at least
implicitly, to be able to commit to maximal transfers in every subsequent period; whether
revolution could be avoided then depended only on economic fundamentals. There are two
ways to introduce commitment problems for the elite: (1) intra-period hold-up and (2)
the inability to commit intertemporally. Since it turns out that intra-period hold-up (i.e.,
when the tax rate is set after the revolution decision) is not very interesting because zero
redistribution is always a dominant strategy for elites, I follow Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000) and focus on the intertemporal commitment problem.
5.1 Democracy in the baseline model
In the previous sections, there has been no difference between democratization and full
redistribution (τt = τˆst ∀t) under elite control. Under democracy, since the median agent
41Observe that, for Cases (4) and (5) to hold, β must be sufficiently small. This is a technical result that
follows from Assumption 3, and is necessary to ensure that lifetime utilities remain finite. This fact also
makes it difficult to find a tractable sufficient condition for growth to mitigate the revolution threat in the
limit of perfect patience, β → 1. Indeed, Assumption 4 implies that β → 1 implies that φ→ 0, which brings
us back to Case (2) and immediate revolution. Perhaps the most appealing interpretation of this result is
that β → 1 represents the limit of short period lengths and frequent actions. Under this interpretation, the
fact that the revolution threat binds today means that it will also bind in an arbitrarily large number of
subsequent periods, and hence it may as well be acted on today. While this result is plausible, I suggest
that it is best thought of as a technical artifact.
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is poor and the policy space (the set of feasible tax rates) is one-dimensional, the Median
Voter Theorem implies that τt = τˆst ∀t. Since I have implicitly assumed that the elites
have the power to commit to such taxation paths, redistribution under democracy can be
no better for poor agents. I can therefore restate parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 5 as follows.
Proposition 5’: When there is a high degree of economic inequality and the poor are
credit-constrained, peaceful democracy cannot be supported when the low state is highly
persistent or when growth rates are very low.
In this context, “revolution” cannot be interpreted in the political sense, for poor agents
already control the political system. Instead, it should be thought of as costly social or
political conflict – either by direct expropriation of wealth (through civil conflict, riots,
etc.) or by large-scale political and economic overhauls. This result therefore says that
even democratic societies are prone to suffer from social conflict when inequality is high
and growth is low or transient. This is consistent with the analysis in Friedman (2006,
2009).
On the other hand, the following result yields the positive conclusion that, if economic
fundamentals are sufficiently good to support democracy, the wealth distribution will con-
verge to perfect equality in the long run. As the economy continues on its development
path, poor agents are able to start accumulating. After this point, redistributive policies
let them “catch up” with the elites on a per capita basis.
Proposition 6: If revolution can be avoided and maximal redistribution continues in-
definitely, limt→∞ θt = δ. That is, the economy converges to perfect equality. Moreover,
this convergence is monotone.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The more interesting cases are when the feasible redistribution schedules under democ-
racy and elite control are distinct due to commitment issues. This is the issue I take up in
the next subsection.
5.2 Intertemporal commitment problems
Suppose now that, as in Acemolgu and Robinson (2000, 2006), the revolution threat is
stochastic in the following sense. In addition to the aggregate growth state, in each period
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the poor are either coordinated (c) or not coordinated (n). Denote this state variable by
rt ∈ {c, n}, which is distributed i.i.d. in each period with Pr(r = c) = p. The costs to
revolution now depend on the variable rt, i.e., with µ(c) = µ and µ(n) = 1. Hence, when
poor agents are coordinated, payoffs are as described previously and the revolution threat
is real. When poor agents are not coordinated, all output is destroyed during revolution,
meaning that revolt is always strictly dominated. This specification implies that the elites
have a commitment problem: when rt = n, it is always optimal for them to set τ = 0.
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Let (st, rt) = (H, c). Clearly if p = 0, the value function for poor agents in this case is
equal to
(1− τt)hpt + Tt + βqHV p(H,hpt + Tt, τ ≡ 0) + β(1− qH)V p(L, hpt + Tt, τ ≡ 0)
since no transfers will be received in the future. If p = 1, there is no commitment problem
and the value function is the same as in the previous section under maximal redistribution
(see, e.g., the proof of Proposition 5).
The first observation is that, when st = L, current transfers are equal to zero regardless
of the value of rt; this follows from my assumptions on the distribution technology. The
commitment problem therefore reduces poor agents’ expected payoffs in the low state only
through expected transfers when the high state is realized. This suggests the following
fact, the proof of which is omitted because it is trivial.
Lemma 8: Under the same conditions as Proposition 5 and if s0 = L, there exists
q∗∗L (p) ∈ (0, 1) such that qL > q∗∗L (p) implies immediate revolution. This cutoff level is
strictly increasing in p with q∗∗L (0) = 0 and q
∗∗




L is defined in part 1 of
Proposition 5.
In words, more severe commitment problems can induce revolution in the low state, even
when it is not very persistent. Complete lack of commitment induces immediate revolution
even when the low state is completely transient (qL = 0), since no redistribution will take
place in the high state. An analogue of part 3 of Proposition 5 can be similarly obtained.
More generally, I want to answer the question: In this environment, when will the
elites choose to democratize to mitigate the revolution threat? Clearly, the fundamentals
42Clearly there are other ways to model such commitment issues. The stochastic revolution threat is
analytically convenient and allows for direct comparison with extant results.
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(φ, qH , qL) must be “strong enough” to prevent revolution when there is maximal redis-
tribution in every period, since this is what will occur when poor agents select the tax
rate under democracy. In addition, as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) the probability
that a revolutionary threat materializes p must be low enough that revolution would occur
without democratization because the promise to continue redistribution in the future is not
credible. The remaining question is then how the critical value p∗ that makes poor agents
indifferent between revolution and accepting elite control depends on the fundamentals
(φ, qH , qL)? The intuition behind Lemma 8 suggests the following fact.
Proposition 7: Suppose that poor agents prefer permanent, maximal redistribution to
revolution and that one-period transfers cannot prevent revolution. The cutoff value p∗ is
• Decreasing in φ and qH .
• Increasing in qL.
That is, for p < p∗ the revolution threat is met by democratization. If p ≥ p∗, elites prevent
revolution through (temporary) redistribution.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result mirrors the findings in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), and suggests that
peaceful regime changes from an authoritarian regime to democracy is more likely in (mod-
erately) bad economic times. If the economic fundamentals are bad enough, revolution (or,
in an alternate interpretation, large-scale wealth redistribution) will dominate democrati-
zation for the poor agents. It is possible to solve for explicit cutoff values in the case of
no accumulation (the case with accumulation is more difficult), but since the comparative
statics are obvious I omit the explicit characterization.
The main results obtained up to this point are summarized below for convenience.
Main Predictions:
• If the elites hold political power and suffer from an intertemporal commitment prob-
lem, the threat of revolution is met with democratization if (1) the economic funda-
mentals are not too bad, and (2) the commitment problem is severe.
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• Under the same conditions, the revolution threat is met with voluntary transfers under
elite control if the commitment problem is not too severe. Good economic fundamen-
tals decrease the relative severity of the commitment problem.
• Under the same conditions, or if democracy has already been established, revolution
occurs when inequality is high and the economic fundamentals are bad.
• Rapid and persistent growth implies that the observable actions enumerated above will
occur on-path at an earlier (expected) date.
6 Conclusion and suggestions for future work
This paper has developed a game-theoretic model of inequality, redistribution, and political
conflict in an economy undergoing sustained, stochastic growth. The main insights are
generally consistent with stylized empirical and historical facts about political economy
and growth. Namely, more rapid growth makes tensions related to inequality and wealth
distribution salient earlier along the economy’s development path. At the same time,
the expectation of robust and rapid future growth also provides the means for resolving
such tensions without on-path conflict. Finally, the viability of non-democratic political
institutions is a function not only of the leaders’ ability to commit, but also of the current
and (expected) future economic climate.
There are number of ways to extend the model developed here. Modeling agents as
Ramsey consumers is one, for example. More interesting, I believe, would be to endogenize
the growth mechanism, which in this paper was treated as exogenous. Acemoglu (2009,
2010) partially accomplishes this goal, but is still rooted in neoclassical growth theory and
does not allow for long-run growth. I also think it is important to incorporate social mo-
bility into the present framework. Drawing on the insights of Benabou and Ok (2001), one
can see how expectations about the prospects for upward mobility (which are correlated
with the economy’s aggregate growth rate) would actually decrease the demand for redis-
tribution, further amplifying the positive effects of growth highlighted in this paper. On
the other hand, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) allude to, downward shocks to expecta-
tions about growth would then also correlate with downward shocks to expectations about
mobility prospects. Such a mechanism would provide a powerful – and I believe realistic
– explanation for the establishment of social insurance in the U.S. during the Great De-
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pression – over a century after the initial establishment of a constitutional democracy.43
Modeling mobility is challenging, however, for it requires the modeler to keep track of the
entire (ergodic) income distribution.
Another obvious avenue for further research is a more comprehensive empirical inves-
tigation of the model’s validity. Numerous historical studies examine, for example, the
dynamics of the income distribution and aggregate growth in nineteenth century Britain
during the Industrial Revolution.44 But, by and large, the results are inconclusive or con-
tradictory. To the best of my knowledge, no comprehensive empirical study has examined
these economic variables in conjunction with political reforms across a wide range of de-
veloping countries, though this is likely due to data availability (and reliability) issues. To
study the model’s contemporary relevance, a study using opinion data (such as the World
Values Survey) and consumer expectation survey data to study the link between growth
expectations and political satisfaction could be particularly interesting.
Moreover, the representations of “democracy” and “conflict” that I have chosen in
this paper are admittedly narrow. In particular, oftentimes social conflict is not a “rich
vs. poor” phenomenon; indeed, economic inequality may not be the (primary) cause. In
general, it is not clear that a country’s “level of democracy” is even the best measure for
sociopolitical openness and cohesion. Historically speaking, even democracies are often
home to censorship, discrimination, and disenfranchised subpopulations. Friedman (2006,
2009), for example, emphasizes that economic stagnation often instigates anti-immigrant
sentiments due to concerns about the labor market, religious intolerance, and ethnic clashes.
Sheve and Slaughter (2001) provides a more systematic empirical analysis of the first issue
in a contemporary context. For the latter two, the evidence in Rodrik (1999) indicates that
non-economic – and, in particular, ethnic – divisions are a major correlate with a country’s
sensitivity to negative growth shocks. I believe that these are likely fruitful areas for future
theoretical work.
In ongoing work,45 I develop a complementary political economy model based on a
simple labor search framework, as in Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2003). When economic
growth is strong, the labor market is ripe with “good” jobs, which grant workers economic
rents. But when times are bad, these positions are scarce. When there is heterogeneity
among the workforce that is observable and that results in asymmetric political power –
43Both Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) and Friedman (2006) note that the U.S.’s experience during the
Great Depression is somewhat anomalous with respect to their theories.
44Refer to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Friedman (2006) for a wide range of references.
45This was omitted for the sake of thematic continuity and space constraints.
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due to, e.g., ethnic differences, or the difference between native citizens and immigrants
– it is optimal for the politically enfranchised groups to block those without political
sway.46 This drives output down even further, and can result in a “growth trap” with
low economic activity and large political economy distortions, providing microfoundations
for the reduced-form framework in Caplan (2003). One can also investigate incentives for
other interest groups to form blocking coalitions to break out of this vicious circle.47 These
incentives depend on the mechanisms for surplus division between matched workers and
firms in the labor market.
As discussed in the introduction, incorporating insights from psychology and behavioral
economics into the present political economy setting would likely result in novel insights.
The self-signaling framework developed in Benabou (2008), for example, seems like an
appropriate starting point for such work.
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Derivation of the value functions in Section 3: Observe from the recursive equations
that Equation (11) is immediate. It remains to establish Equation (10). Plugging Equation
(11) into Equation (8) and moving all Vˆ PH terms to the left, we get
Vˆ PH
[
1− βqH − β(1− qH) · β(1− qL)
1− βqL
]
= BhP + φBH + β(1− qH)
BH(1−θ1−δ )
1− βqL ,
where I’ve used the definitions of AH and τˆH . The term in brackets on the left simplifies
to (1−β)[1+β(1−qL−qH)]1−βqL . Substituting h




1 + β(1− qL − qH)
1− βqL + φ.
Dividing through by the factor on the LHS yields the desired result.
Derivation of the post-revolution value functions in Section 3.2: The value func-
tions in this case must satisfy the recursive equations
V P (R|H) = (1− µ)AHH
1− δ + β
[
qHV
P (R|H) + (1− qH)V P (R|L)
]
and
V P (R|L) = (1− µ)BH
1− δ + β
[
qLV
P (R|L) + (1− qL)V P (R|H)
]
.
The remaining calculations are analogous to those in the previous derivation.
8.2 Proofs:
Proof of Lemma 1: Poor agents in period t revolt if and only if ypt (R(t)) > y
p
t+1. In
equilibrium, there must be no revolt when they are indifferent or else there is an open set
problem for the elites. Because they receive nothing after a revolution, elites optimally
choose the largest surplus share consistent with no revolt. If feasible, the optimal level
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is (1+φ)µ−θtφ ∈ [0, 1]. If this quantity is negative, redistribution sufficient to mitigate the
revolution threat is infeasible: ypt (R(t)) > y
p
t and revolt occurs. The only indeterminacy
results from the fact that, when revolution is unavoidable, any offer αt ∈ [0, 1] can be
offered. Since all of these strategies are outcome-equivalent, I refer to the equilibrium as
essentially unique. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 1 and the law
of motion for inequality. In particular, because of the linear production technology and
linear preferences, inequality jumps to its steady state level after a single period. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 2: (1), (3), (4) follow from direct calculation. (2) follows from
β(1− qL) < (1− βqL). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: Let f(L) denote the expression on the RHS of the R(L) con-
straint. Define f(H) analogously. Then direct calculation yields ∂f(H)∂q = −∂f(L)∂q > 0.
Q.E.D.





β(1−qL)(1−δ) . The result follows from taking the appropriate limits of these
expressions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The right hand side of either constraint is positive if and
only if µ > δ. The comparative statics follow immediately from this observation and com-
parison with Proposition 2. Clearly there is never revolution in the high cost case when
µ ≥ θ since the right hand sides of both constraints are strictly positive. In the low cost
case, the right hand side is strictly negative, but if either constraint held we would have
µ ≥ θ > δ > µ, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: The case where hit < X is trivial, as it is just the perpetuity value
of this quantity. When hit ≥ X, the value functions must satisfy the recursive equations
V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0) = (1+φ)hit+β
[




V i(L, hit, τ ≡ 0) = hit + β
[
qL · V i(L, hit, τ ≡ 0) + (1− qL) · V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0)
]
. (20)
The assumption B ≡ 1 is convenient here, as it allows us to solve the second equation in
terms of V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0) as follows:
V i(L, hit, τ ≡ 0) =
hit + β(1− qL) · V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0)
1− βqL . (21)
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In order to solve the first recursive equation, I guess that V i(s, ·, τ ≡ 0) is homogenous of
degree 1 and verify that it gives an appropriate solution. Using this guess and substituting
(18) into (16), we get
V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0) = (1 + φ)hit +
β
[
qH ·(1+φ)·V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0)+(1−qH)·(1+φ)·{





The desired representation of V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0) then follows from tedious algebra, and the
representation of V i(L, hit, τ ≡ 0) follows from substituting that solution into (18). It is
then easy to verify that these solve the required recursive equations. To ensure that these
are the unique solutions (and that the homogeneity assumption is legitimate), note that
all the conditions of Assumption 1 in Alvarez and Stokey (1998) are satisfied, with the
per-period utility function u(c) = c homogenous of degree 1.
Now I show that Assumption 3 holds if and only if both numerators and the denomi-
nators are positive ∀(qL, qH) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], which is necessary to ensure that we haven’t
divided through by zero. The numerator part is clear; the V i(H,hit, τ ≡ 0) is the tighter
constraint. Observe that the denominators are decreasing in φ, and the unique number φ∗
that sets the denominators equal to zero is
φ∗ =
(1− β)(1− β(qH − (1− qL))
β[(1− β)qH + β(1− qL)]) ,
which is decreasing in qH and increasing in qL. Hence, evaluating this expression at
(qL, qH) = (0, 1) yields that φ <
1−β
β if and only if the denominator is positive ∀(qL, qH) ∈
[0, 1]× [0, 1]. This is exactly the condition in Assumption 3.
The comparative statics follow from differentiation. The computations are tedious but
straightforward, so they are omitted. The only nontrivial steps involve repeatedly using
Assumption 3 to sign expressions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: When poor agents are unable to accumulate, the revolution con-
straint reduces to θt > µ. It remains to find the expected law of motion for θ under the
measure induced by ~m. Under this measure, we have θt+1 = mH · 1+φ1+φθt · θt + (1−mH) · θt.
Suppose qL < 1 ⇐⇒ mH > 0. Then the law of motion has fixed points θ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
Since it is monotone increasing in θt and θ0 > 0 by assumption, it must tend toward the
upper fixed point. It is easy to check that the rate of convergence is increasing in φ and
mH . Since mH is increasing in qH and decreasing in qL, it follows that
θt+1
θt
is as well. The
hitting time t∗ is trivially decreasing in θt+1θt , yielding the appropriate comparative statics.
Finiteness follows from the fact that µ < 1 and that θt will hit any open neighborhood of
1 in finite time.
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Suppose qL = 1. Then the only fixed point to the law of motion is θ
∗ = θ0 ≤ µ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Part 1: Let s0 = L. Since only null transfers are possible, poor agents can begin to
accumulate no sooner than t = 1. Let Vˆ p(st, h
p
t ) denote the value function for poor agents
in state st with wealth h
p
t < X when τt = τˆ ∀s ≥ t. For st = L this must satisfy the
recursive equation
Vˆ p(L, hpt ) = h
p
t + βqLVˆ
p(L, hpt ) + β(1− qL)Vˆ p(H,hpt ).
By simple algebra and continuity we have
lim
qL→1
Vˆ p(L, hpt ) =
hpt
1− β ,
which is precisely equal to V p(L, hpt , τ ≡ 0) for hpt < X. Since by assumption V p(R(0)) >
V p(L, hp0, τ ≡ 0), there must exists q∗L ∈ (0, 1) such that V p(R(0)) > Vˆ p(L, hp0) ∀qL > q∗L.
But this is the definition of R(L, 0), so this part of the proposition is proved.
Part 2: Let s0 = H. When φ = 0, the value function for poor agents under maximal
redistribution is identical to V p(H,hp0, τ ≡ 0) since positive redistribution is never feasible.
Since the revolution constraint binds by hypothesis, there is immediate revolution. If the
value function under maximal redistribution is continuous in φ (from the right at φ = 0),
the claim is proved.
That this is true follows from the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem (LDCT).




βt((1− τˆst)hpt + Tˆst)|s0 = H].
This should be viewed as a double integral over {L,H}N × N (endowed with the discrete
sigma algebras) with respect to the product measure over sequences of states and time.
Formally, this measure is P := Q×µ, where Q is induced on the appropriate sequence space
by the Markov transition kernel and µ is the counting measure on N. Though I’ve written
it as an iterated integral, it is of course the same as the double integral described above by
Tonelli’s Theorem (the measure spaces are countably generated and clearly σ-finite).






(1 + φkθt−1)Ht−1 and hk(L, t) := hk(·, t − 1), where φk → 0. Since un-
der any redistributive scheme θt > δ ∀t < ∞ (see the proof of Proposition 6), clearly
hk(st, t) < Ht ∀t ∈ N. Under Assumption 3, this dominating function is integrable in the
above sense. (This follows from the equivalence of the sequence and recursive formulations
and the cited results in Alvarez and Stokey (1998).) Continuity then follows from the
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LDCT.48
Part 3: When st = L, redistribution in period t is zero. Hence, at qL = 1 and qH = 0, the
value function in s0 = H under maximal redistribution is equal exactly to the perpetuity
value of hp1, since poor agents are assumed to not be able to accumulate after this one-time
transfers. This returns the revolution constraint, which holds by assumption. The result
follows from continuity of the value functions in the transition probabilities. (This can be
seen from the recursive equations that they must satisfy.)







(1 + φθ)H ≥ 1− µ
1− δ ·H.
The middle expression is increasing, unbounded, and continuous in φ, so there clearly exists
an open interval I ⊂ R++ such that the above inequalities are satisfied for φ ∈ I. The
necessary conditions are obvious. To obtain the expression for θ1, note that under maximal
transfers




Dividing through by H0 · (1 + φθ0), we get












Because the poor cannot accumulate in period 1 by assumption, the revolution constraint
when there are no further transfers reduces to θ1 > µ, i.e., µ ≥ θ1 is necessary and sufficient
for revolution to be avoided without additional transfers in t = 1. A necessary condition
for this is θ0 > θ1. Note that θ0 > θ1 if and only if
θ20
1+φθ0
> δ1+φ ; a sufficient condition is
θ > 1√
2
since δ < 12 .
Part 5: This is similar to the proof or Part 4. Denote h˜p(φ) := h1+φ+
φ
1+φ(1+φθ)H so that
revolution is avoided and accumulation occurs if and only if h˜p(φ) ≥ max{X, 1−µ1−δ · H0}.
When β = 0, h˜p = V p(H, h˜
p
1+φ , τ ≡ 0). Moreover, β = 0 makes the restriction of Assump-
tion 3 vacuous, so φ is not bounded above and this inequality can be satisfied. Continuity
(from the right) of V p(s, ·, τ ≡ 0) in β at β = 0 yields that the same statements hold for
small β. Since both types begin to accumulate, in the absence of future transfers inequality
is constant; hence the revolution constraint never binds again.
48It is easy to show (right) continuity of the value function at φ = 0 in the recursive formulation when
(qH , qL) is in a neighborhood of (0, 1). I have not found an easy proof that extends this result to all
(qH , qL) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
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To see why β must be small, consider the following argument. For fixed φ, this value
function is increasing in β. But since φ is bounded above by a function of β by As-
sumption 3, we must substitute φ = 1−ββ −  for  small to get the maximum accept-
able growth rate. Then, we must differentiate with respect to β. At exactly φ = 1−ββ
(which is not a problem for (qH , qL) on the interior of the unit square), the value function
V p(s, h, τ ≡ 0) = h·[1−β(qH−(1−qL)]β(1−β)(1−qH) . This decreases until β =
1
2 and increases thereafter.
But, for β ≈ 1, when the value function becomes large again, the maximal φ becomes small
by Assumption 3 and it is possible that poor agents will not be transferred enough to begin
accumulation in the first place. Obtaining a nontrivial sufficient condition in that case is
somewhat unwieldy, so I do not give one. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: When st = L, there is no accumulation and no redistribu-
tion, so it suffices to only consider the case st = H. (The fraction of time spent in the low
state only slows down the speed of convergence.) Since elites are assumed to be able to
accumulate in the initial period and the aggregate economy is growing at a positive rate,
it is easy to see that poor agents must begin accumulation in finite time under maximal
redistribution. Under maximal transfers and when both types accumulate, in the high
state we have












This difference equation has a unique fixed point θ∗ = δ. Because θ0 > δ by assumption,
for all t <∞ we have θt > δ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: The statement for qL follows directly from Lemma 8, which
itself does not require proof, and inverting the q∗∗L (p) mapping. The other conditions fol-
low analogously. For further details, refer to the similar computations in the body text of
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). Q.E.D.
48
